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ENGLISH v. GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY:
THE STATE RIGHT TO REGULATE THE NUCLEAR
ENERGY INDUSTRY AFFIRMED--(ALBEIT INDIRECT)
INTRODUCTION
The early history of the U.S. nuclear energy industry is marked by
noticeably lax federal regulation.' There are several proposed explana-
tions; most involve economic encouragement by the federal government
for the then new industry and focus on the promise of producing nuclear
energy "too cheap to meter. ' 2 During the late 1960s and early 1970s,
however, the pro-nuclear consensus of the American public began to
break doWn.3 In the face of growing public scrutiny and criticism, the
federal government's Atomic Energy Commission, created by the Atomic
Energy Act of 1946 to encourage research and promote development of
nuclear energy, adopted a "much more active regulatory stance." 4
During the past three decades, the U.S. Supreme Court only infre-
quently addressed the issue of whether the regulation of the nuclear energy
industry was purely a federal responsibility, or phrasing the issue another
way, whether the states were pre-empted from playing an active role in
regulating this new power source.' The Court repeatedly found that,
Congress through the legislation it had enacted addressing this issue,
intended that the "federal government has exclusive authority under the
doctrine of pre-emption to regulate the construction and operation of
nuclear power plants .... "6
More recent Supreme Court decisions, however, suggest that the reg-
ulatory authority over the nuclear industry has and is continuing to change.
In 1983 for example, Justice Blackmun wrote in Silkwood, in the dis-
1. England & Mitchell, FederalRegulation and Environmenmal mpact of the United StatesNuclear
Power Industry, 1974-1984, 30 Nat. Res. J. 537, 539 (1990).
.2. J. Tomain, J. Hickey Jr. & S. Hollis, Energy Law and Policy 392 (1989).
3. Id. at 389.
4. England & Mitchell, supra note 1, at 540 (citing Freudenburg and Baxter, Nuclear Reactions:
Public Attitudes and Policies Toward Nuclear Power, 5 Policy Studies Rev. 97-98 (1985)). "Freu-
denburg and Baxter point out, for example, that whereas the Atomic Energy Commission had fewer
than a dozen active regulations in 1970, there were several dozen by 1972, and several hundred by
1977." Id.
5. Power Reactor Dev. Co. v. Inter. Union of Elec.. Radio & Machine Workers, 367 U.S. 396
(1961); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resource Defense Council Inc., 435 U.S.
519 (1978); Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), affd mem..
405 U.S. 1035 (1972); Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation and
Development Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp. 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
6. Northern States Power, 447 F.2d at 1154.
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senting opinion by the Supreme Court whose majority had allowed a state
court to award punitive damages in a case involving a worker exposed
to radiation at a nuclear facility, that states were now in a position to
indirectly regulate both radiological hazards and the nuclear energy in-
dustry through the use of judicial decisions.7 However, in 1990 Justice
Blackmun wrote the unanimous opinion in English v. General Electric
Company, a case which held that an employee at a nuclear fuel production
facility was not pre-empted by federal law from bringing an action against
her employer for intentional infliction of emotional distress.8 In only seven
years, one Supreme Court Justice went from writing a dissenting opinion
which criticized the Supreme Court for recognizing the states' ability to
regulate (at least indirectly) the nuclear energy industry, to writing an
unanimous Supreme Court opinion which allows state-law tort claims
against employers in the nuclear energy industry.
This author argues that the decision in English v. General Electric
Company confirms the opportunity for states to indirectly regulate the
nuclear energy industry (and radiological matters) which before were in
the exclusive purview of the federal government.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Petitioner Vera English was employed from 1972 to 1984 as a labo-
ratory technician at the nuclear-fuels production facility operated by Gen-
eral Electric Company (GE) in Wilmington, North Carolina.9 She
complained to General Electric's management and to the Nuclear Reg-
ulatory Commission (NRC) about several "perceived violations of nuclear
safety standards at the facility, including the failure of her co-workers to
clean up radioactive material spills in the laboratory." " Petitioner's em-
ployment was terminated shortly thereafter and she subsequently filed a
complaint with the Secretary of Labor charging GE with violating a
section of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974." Section 210(a) of
that Act makes it unlawful for an employer in the nuclear industry to
discharge an employee in retaliation for initiating a nuclear safety-vio-
lation complaint.' 2 This provision has become commonly known as the
""whistleblower" protection clause.
7. "The punitive damages award therefore enables a State to enforce a standard that is more
exacting than the federal standard." Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 265. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
8. English v. General Electric Company, - U.S. -., 110 S. Ct. 2270, 110 L.Ed. 55 (1990).
9. Id. 110 S.Ct at 2273.
10. Id.
11. 42 U.S.C. §5851 (1988) as amended, 92 Star 2951, §210.
12. 42 U.S.C. §210(a) "No employer ... may discharge any employee because the em-
ployee...
(1) commenced ... a proceeding for the administration or enforcement of any
requirement imposed under this Act.... " 42 U.S.C. § 5851 (a) as amended, 92 Stat
2951.
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The controversy was referred to an administrative law judge who found
that GE had violated Section 210(a), but dismissed the complaint as
untimely -because it had not been filed within the alloted time period
following the company's final notice of employment termination.' 3 As-
serting that her inability to proceed with an administrative claim against
GE did not preclude her from pursuing a state-law tort claim, petitioner
subsequently filed a diversity action against GE in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina seeking com-
pensatory and punitive damages from GE for intentional infliction of
emotional distress. "
Although the District Court found that petitioner stated a valid claim
for intentional infliction of emotional distress under North Carolina law,
it nevertheless granted GE's motion to dismiss.'" GE argued that peti-
tioner's claim fell within the field of "nuclear safety." 6 Its argument was
that the field of nuclear safety regulations was an area of law that had
been completely pre-empted by the Federal Government. Instead, the
District Court held that petitioner's claim was pre-empted because it
conflicted with three particular aspects of Section 210: (1) a provision
that bars recovery under the section to any employee who deliberately
causes a violation of any requirement of- the Energy Reorganization Act
or of the Atomic Energy Act; (2) the absence of any provision generally
authorizing the Secretary to award exemplary or punitive damages; and
(3) the provisions .requiring that the employee invoking the statute file
an administrative complaint within 30 days after the violation occurs,
and that the Secretary resolve the complaint within 90 days after its
filing."
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
dismissal of petitioner's claim for intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress."8 The Appeals Court noted that "[tihe district court's opinion has
correctly identified and applied the relevant federal and state law."' 9
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari because of "an
apparent conflict with a decision of the First Circuit." 2" The sole question
for the Court's resolution was whether the federal government had "pre-
empted petitioner's state-law tort claim for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress." 2'
13. English, 110 S.Ct. at 2274.
14. English v. General Electric Company, 683 F Supp. 1006 (1988).
15. English, 110 S.Ct. at 2274.
16. Id.
17. See sections 210(g), 210(b) (1) and 210 (b) (2) (a). 42 U.S.C. §5851 as amended, 92 Stat
2951.
18. English v. General Electric Company, 872 F.2d 22 (1989).
19. Id. at 23.
20. English v. General Electric Company, 110 S.Ct. at 2275. See Norris v. Lumberman's Mutual
Casualty Company, 881 F.2d 1144 (1989) (holding that Congress, in the Energy Reorganization
Plan of 1974, did not intend to preempt state law actions involving nuclear whistleblowers).
21. English, 110 S.Ct. at 2275.
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DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
Justice Blackmun, writing for a unanimous Court, analyzed two basic
issues:
A) whether state-law tort claims were in an area or field that
Congress intended the Federal Government to occupy exclusively,
and
B) whether state law was pre-empted to the extent that it actually
conflicted with federal law.
The Court determined that petitioner's tort claim was not pre-empted
by federal law because it was neither motivated by safety concerns nor
was its effect direct or substantial enough to place it in the pre-empted
field of nuclear safety. Further, the Supreme Court did not agree with the
lower court's conclusion that petitioner's claim conflicted with federal
law.
Congressional Pre-emption in the Field of Nuclear Safety
The English Court noted this was not the first case in which the Supreme
Court considered the extent to which Congress had "pre-empted the field
of nuclear safety." 22 In Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v. State Energy
Resources Conservation and Develpoment Comm'n., the Court carefully
analyzed the various congressional enactments relating to the nuclear
energy industry.23 The English Court, subsequently, relied extensively on
that previous Supreme Court analysis. The English Court adopted the
Pacific Gas Court's discussion of congressional actions taken in the nu-
clear energy realm as well as the conclusions the previous Court drew
from reviewing those congressional actions.2'
History of Nuclear Energy Regulation in the United States
"Until 1954, the use, control, and ownership of all nuclear technology
remained a federal monopoly. "' During the earliest stages of nuclear
energy development, the federal government gave states little authority
to regulate the nuclear energy industry. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954,
however, reflected Congress' evolving belief that the national interest
would be best served if the government encouraged the private sector to
"develop atomic energy for peaceful purposes under a program of federal
regulation and licensing." ' 6 The Act implemented this policy decision
by allowing private construction, ownership, and operation of commercial
22. Id. at 2276.
23. Pacific Gas and Electric v. State Energy, 461 U.S. 190 (1983).
24. English, 110 S.Ct. at 2276.
25. Id.
26. Id.
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nuclear-power reactors under the supervision of the Atomic Energy Com-
mission (AEC).2' With respect to matters of national security and public
health and safety, "no significant role was contemplated for the states." 2'
In 1959, Congress amended the Atomic Energy Act to clarify the
respective responsibilities of the states and the federal government in
relation to the regulation of byproduct, source, and special nuclear ma-
terials, and "generally to increase the State's role."" This amendment
marked the first real, albeit very slight, opportunity for states to participate
in the regulation of nuclear energy.
In 1974, Congress passed the Energy Reorganization Act which abol-
ished the AEC and transferred its regulatory and licensing authority to
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). 0 The 1974 Act also ex-
panded the number and range of safety responsibiiities under the NRC's
charge.3 As the Court noted in Pacific Gas, the NRC did "not purport
to exercise, its authority based upon economic considerations," but rather
was concerned primarily with public health and safety.3
In 1978, Congress amended both the Atomic Energy Act and the Energy
Reorganization Act. 3 Among those amendments is Section 210, the pro-
vision that encourages employees in the nuclear industry to report safety
violations and provides a mechanism for protecting them against retali-
ation for doing so. GE claimed it was these federal law provisions that
pre-empted Vera English from using state tort law to bring an action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress against them.
THE FIELD OF NUCLEAR SAFETY
In Pacific Gas, the Supreme Court concluded that "the Federal Gov-
ernment has occupied the entire field of nuclear safety concerns, except
the limited powers expressly ceded to the States."3' In addition, the Court
stressed that Congress intended that only "the Federal Government should
regulate the radiological safety aspects involved in the construction and
operation of a nuclear plant."'
27. Id. "[The federal government's] prime area of concern in the licensing context . .. (was]
national security, public health, and safety." Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. National
Resources Defense Council Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 550 (1978).
28. English, 110 S.Ct. at 2276.
29. Id. The 1959 Amendments authorized the NRC, by agreements with state governors to
discontinue the federal government's regulatory authority over certain nuclear materials under specific
conditions. State regulatory programs adopted under the amendment were required to be "coordinated
and compatible with those of the AEC." 42 U.S.C. §2021(a) (I) & 2021(g) (1988).
30. 42 U.S.C. §5801 et seq. See specifically section 5841(f).
31. English. 110 S.Ct. at 2276.
32. Pacific Gas and Electric v. State Energy, 461 U.S. 190, 207 (1983).
33. English, 110 S.Ct. at 2276-77.
34. 42 U.S.C. §5851 (1988) as amended, 92 Stat 2951, §210(a).
35. Pacific Gas and Electric v. State Energy, 461 U.S. at 212.
36. d. at 205.
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Vera English and GE disagreed as to whether petitioner's tort action
claim fell within the boundaries of the pre-empted field referred to in
Pacific Gas. Respondent, General Electric, maintained that the pre-empted
field is a "large one" and that section 210 is an integral part of it.
37
Specifically, respondent argued that since the Federal Government is in
a better position to promote nuclear safety if "whistleblowers" pursue
the federal remedy, the whole area or field marked off by section 210
should be considered part of the pre-empted field identified in Pacific
Gas.3" Accordingly, General Electric argued that all state-law remedies
for conduct covered by section 210 are pre-empted.39
Petitioner (and the United States as amicus curiae) maintained that her
state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress was not
pre-empted by federal law because the Supreme Court made clear in
Pacific Gas that state laws supported by nonsafety rationales do not lie
within the pre-empted field of nuclear safety.' They argued that since
the state tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress is supported
by a nonsafety rationale-the state's interest in protecting its citizens
from the kind of abuse of which Vera English complained-the cause of
action must proceed.4' The United States Supreme Court determined both
arguments to be "somewhat wide of the mark." 42
The English Court found no "clear and manifest" intent on the part
of Congress in enacting section 210 to pre-empt all state tort laws that
traditionally had been available to persons who, like petitioner, alleged
outrageous conduct at the hands of an employer.43 The Court noted that
acceptance of GE's argument would require it to conclude that Congress
had displaced not only state tort law, but also state criminal law to the
extent that such criminal law is applied to retaliatory conduct occurring
37. English, 110 S.Ct. at 2277.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. "Despite respondent's portrayal of the claim for damages as an attempt to discourage
employer conduct relating to nuclear safety, petitioner is seeking recovery based only on common-
law tort principles that bar the intentional infliction of emotional distress; the state cause of action
does not reflect any state policy specifically concerning nuclear safety complaints." Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curiae, p.13, English v. General Electric Company, - U.S_, 110
S.Ct. 2270, 110 L.Ed. 55 (1990).
41. English, 110 S.Ct. at 2277.
42. Id.
43. Id. "In addition to challenging her employer's actions in transferring and ultimately firing
her, petitioner alleged that respondent: (1) removed her from the laboratory under guard 'as if she
were a criminal'; (2) assigned her to degrading 'make work' in her substitute assignment; (3) derided
her as 'paranoid'; (4) barred her from working in controlled areas; (5) placed her under constant
surveillance during work hours; (6) isolated her from co-workers, even during lunch periods; (7)
conspired to charge her fraudulently with violations of safety and criminal law." Brief for the United
States as Amicus Curiae at 3-4 (citing Pet. App. 27(a)), English v. General Electric Company,
U.S. -. , 110 S.Ct. 2270, 110 L.Ed. 55 (1990).
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at the site of a nuclear facility." The Supreme Court provided the example
that "if an employer were to retaliate against a nuclear whistleblower by
hiring thugs to assault the employee on the job. . . respondent's position
would imply that the state criminal law prohibiting such conduct is within
a pre-empted field."'45 The Court did not believe Congress intended such
a result and found no basis for respondent's contention that all state-law
claims arising from conduct covered by section 210 are necessarily in-
cluded in the pre-empted field. ' Instead, the Court determined that "the
District Court was essentially correct in observing that while Section 210
obviously bears some relation to the field of nuclear safety, its paramount
purpose was the protection of employees."47
The Court did not, however, accept petitioner's position either. Vera
English argued that since the state-law tort claim was "motivated" by
something other than nuclear safety concerns, the claim was not pre-
empted.' The Court reasoned that even as the Pacific Gas decision in-
dicates that part of the pre-empted field is defined by reference to the
purpose of the state law in question, it made clear that another part of
the field is defined by the state law's actual effect on nuclear safety.4
"The real issue, then, is whether petitioner's tort claim is so related to
the radiological safety aspects involved in the operation of a nuclear
facility that it falls within the pre-empted field. '
The Court began by emphasizing that "not every state law that in some
remote way may affect the nuclear safety decisions made by those who
build and run nuclear facilities can be said to fall within the pre-empted
field." 5 For a state law to fall within the pre-empted zone, "it must have
some direct and substantial effect on the decisions made by those who
build or operate nuclear facilities concerning radiological safety levels." 52
Justice Blackmun's opinion, then, provides the reader with an example
of one of the potential regulatory-type effects of which he wrote seven
years earlier in the Silkwood dissenting opinion.
Justice Blackmun's hypothetical example notes that if "employers find
retaliation more costly, they will be forced to deal with complaints by
whistleblowers by other means, including altering radiological safety
44. English, 110 S.Ct. at 2277.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. ld. "[W]e note that the enforcement and implementation of Section 210 was entrusted by
Congress not to the NRC-the body primarily responsible for nuclear safety regulation--but to the
Department of Labor." English, 110 S.Ct. at 2277 n.6.
48. English, 110 S.Ct. at 2278.
49. id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
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policies."53 "Nevertheless, we believe that this effect is neither direct
nor substantial enough to place petitioner's claim in the pre-empted field." '
Justice Blackmun cited the Silkwood decision and wrote how in that
case the Supreme Court held that "a claim for punitive damages in a
state tort action arising out of the escape of plutonium from a federally
licensed nuclear facility did not fall within the pre-empted field discussed
in Pacific Gas."" Justice Blackmun also recorded in the English decision
the Court's thinking that how the Court thought "it would be odd, if not
irrational, to conclude that Congress intended to include tort actions
stemming from retaliation against whistleblowers in the pre-empted field
but intended not to include tort actions stemming from radiation damage
suffered as a result of actual safety violations."'
Accordingly, the Supreme Court noted that potential liability for the
kind of claim at issue in Silkwood will affect radiological safety decisions
more directly than will potential liability under the kind of claim Vera
English brought before the Court.57 Indeed, "the prospect of compen-
satory and punitive damages for radiation-based injuries will undoubtedly
affect nuclear employers' primary decisions about radiological safety in
the construction and operation of nuclear power facilities far more sub-
stantially than will liability under the kind of claim petitioner asserts."I'
Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that Vera English's state-law claim
for intentional infliction of emotional distress was not within the pre-
empted field of nuclear safety.59
Did the Lower Court Err in Concluding That Petitioner's Claim
Conflicted With Federal Law?
The Court addressed whether petitioner's state-law tort claim of in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress was preempted by the Energy
Reorganization Act because it conflicted with section 210. The district
court identified three features of section 210 it believed were incompatible
with petitioner's claim.'
The district court relied first on section 210(g) which provides that the
prohibition on employer retaliation "shall not apply" where an employee
deliberately causes a violation of any requirement of the Energy Reor-
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 2278-79.
56. Id. at 2279.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. English v. General Electric Company, 683 F.Supp. 1006, 1013 (1988).
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ganization Act or of the Atomic Energy Act.6 The district court and GE
believed that section 210(g) reflected a congressional desire to preclude
all relief, including state-law remedies, to a whistleblower who delib-
erately commits a safety violation referred to in section 210(g).62
The Supreme Court, however, found that the "text of section 210(g)
specifically limits its applicability to the remedy provided by section
210(a)" and does not suggest that it bars state-law tort actions. 3 Section
210(a) prohibits employer retaliation and grants a federal administrative
remedy to employees in the nuclear energy industry.' In addition, the
legislative history of section 210 reveals a clear congressional intent to
supplant state-law causes of action that might afford broader relief. '
In any event, even if the lower court was correct in concluding that
Congress wanted those who deliberately commit nuclear-safety violations
to be denied all remedies against employer retaliation, "this federal in-
teres.t would be served only to the extent that it afforded recovery to such
violators."'  In the case before the bench the administrative law judge
found that Vera English had not deliberately committed a safety violation
within the meaning of section 210.67 Thus, the lower court's conclusion
that the state-law tort claim conflicted with section 210 was rejected by
the Supreme Court because Vera English had not deliberately committed
a safety violation.
The second reason why the lower court found that petitioner's claim
was in conflict with federal law involved what the district court thought
was an absence in section 210 of general authorizations for the Secretary
of Labor to award exemplary damages against employers who engage in
retaliatory conduct." The district court's reasoning was that if section
210 did not allow awards of exemplary damages, then a state-law tort
claim that did would be in conflict with the federal law. The Supreme
Court found, however, that according to the federal protections granted
whistleblowers under the Energy Reorganization Act, a district court can
61. "Subsection (a) of this section shall not apply with respect to any employee who, acting
without direction from his or her employer (or the employer's agent), deliberately causes a violation
of any requirement of this chapter or of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended." 42 U.S.C.
§5851 (1988) as amended, 92 Stat. 2951, §210(g).
62. English, 1I0 S.Ct. at 2280.
63. Id.
64. "Any person adversely affected or aggrieved by an order issued under subsection (b) of this
section may obtain review of the order in the United States court of appeals for the circuit in which
the violation, with respect to which the order was issued, allegedly occurred." 42 U.S.C. §5851
(1988) as amended, 92 Stat. 2951 §210(c).
65. English, 110 S.Ct. at 2280.
66. Id. (emphasis included).
67. Id.
68. ld.
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award exemplary damages in enforcement proceedings brought by the
Secretary of Labor." More importantly, the Supreme Court noted that
the district court failed to follow the Supreme Court's teaching that
"[o]rdinarily, state causes of action are not pre-empted solely because
they impose liability over and above that authorized by federal law."
7
Absent some specific language in the text or suggestion in the legislative
history of section 210, the Supreme Court could not conclude that Con-
gress intended to pre-empt all state actions that permit the recovery of
exemplary damages.7
Finally, the Supreme Court addressed the district court's holding that
the expeditious time frames provided by Congress for the processing of
section 210 claims reflect a congressional decision that no whistleblower
should be able to recover under any other law after the time for filing
under section 210 had expired. 2 The district court adopted GE's argument
that if a state-law remedy is available after the time limit for filing a
section 210 complaint has expired, a whistleblower will have less incen-
tive to bring a section 210 complaint.73 As a result, the argument runs,
federal regulatory agencies will remain unaware of some safety violations
and retaliatory behavior, and will thus be unable to ensure radiological
safety at nuclear facilities.74
Justice Blackmun responded by noting that there was some force to
that argument, "but we do not believe that problem is as great as re-
spondent suggests. '75 Justice Blackmun reasoned that most retaliatory
incidents arise as a response to safety complaints which employees register
with federal regulatory agencies. 71 "The Federal Government thus is
already aware of these safety violations, whether or not the employee
invokes the remedial provisions of Section 210. ' '7 Finally, the Supreme
Court did not agree with respondent's belief that employees will forego
their section 210 options and rely solely on state remedies for retaliation.78
In general, pre-emption is ordinarily not to be implied absent "actual
conflict." 79
69. "In actions brought under this subsection, the district courts shall have jurisdiction to grant
all appropriate relief including, but not limited to, injunctive relief, compensatory, and exemplary
damages." 42 U.S.C. §5851 (1988) as amended, 92 Stat. 2951 §210(d).
70. English, 110 S.Ct. at 2280 (quoting California v. ARC'America Corp. 490 U.S. 93, 99
(1989)).
71. English, 110 S.Ct. at 2280.
72. English, 683 F.Supp. 1006 at 1014-1015.
73. English. I10 S.Ct. at 2281.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 2281. (E.g.. Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533 (1912)).
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The Supreme Court concluded by finding that petitioner's claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress did not fall within the pre-
empted field of nuclear safety as that field has been defined by prior cases.
Nor did it conflict with any particular aspect of section 210 of the Energy
Reorganization Act. The lower court's judgment was reversed and the
case remanded for further proceedings consistent with Justice Blackmun's
opinion.
CONCLUSION
The early history of the nuclear energy industry is dominated by almost
exclusive federal government control and regulation. In the broadest sense,
that history remains intact. Recent Supreme Court decisions, however,
indicate that states are now capable of indirect regulation of the nuclear
energy industry.
English v. General Electric is such an example of a judicial decision
with the potential to empower states with an opportunity to indirectly
regulate the nuclear energy industry.
WES BOGDAN
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